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THE NCCUSL SHOULD ABANDON ITS
SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS AND ADDRESS
MORE DIFFICULT AND CONTROVERSIAL
ISSUES APPLYING "PROCESS" CONCEPTS
Richard A. Elbrecht*
I. INTRODUCTION
The need for a comprehensive commercial code is greater than
ever. That is because the private business sector needs well-drafted
rules to govern its transactions, and business is more active and di-
verse than in the past. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or
Code), however, is not meeting today's needs. As evidence, one need
only look at the large volume of non-UCC statutes and regulations
covering one of its most important subject areas-the sale of goods.'
If the Code were a true "code," these non-UCC provisions would not
be needed.
Webster's Dictionary defines "code" as "a systematic complete
written collection of law arranged logically with index and table of
contents and covering fully one or more subjects of law."2 Black's
Law Dictionary defines "code" as "[a] systematic collection, compen-
dium or revision of laws, rules, or regulations. ' While a code of stat-
utes can never be a "complete" statement of the law that applies to a
particular situation, the volume of statutes that supplement the UCC's
provisions is now large enough to put its status as a code into
question.
* Supervising Attorney, Legal Services Unit, California Department of Consumer
Affairs; B.A., 1955, Yale College; J.D., 1960, University of Michigan; Deputy Director,
National Consumer Law Center, 1969-1971; Co-drafter, National Consumer Act, 1970; Co-
drafter, Wisconsin Consumer Act, 1972; Editor, Consumer Viewpoints: Critique of the Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code (Consumer Research Foundation, 1969 and 1971 editions);
Co-editor, Consumer Law Sourcebook for Small Claims Judicial Officers (Department of
Consumer Affairs, 1985, 1988, and 1991 editions); Co-drafter, California Small Claims Act
(1991, 1992).
1. See infra appendix.
2. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 437 (Philip Babcock ed.
1976).
3. BLACK'S LAW DIClIONARY 257 (6th ed. 1990).
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The Code is deficient in both its scope and depth of coverage. It
excludes many important subject areas-for example sales of services4
and sales of real property improvements. Furthermore, many of its
assumptions in the areas it does cover are no longer valid. While
there are at least four parties in the typical sale of a durable commer-
cial or consumer product-the manufacturer, the retail seller, the
buyer, and a third-party financier-Article 2 is written as though
there were only two parties-a seller and a buyer.5 The UCC hardly
references third-party credit, even though third-party credit usually
forms an integral part of most big-ticket product sales.6
While the courts do craft rulps to fill in the gaps and try to adapt
the Code to the real world, judicial law making is a slow, expensive,
and haphazard process. This process also lacks the checks and bal-
ances of the democratic lawmaking process, and has unpredictable re-
sults. While this antiquated public-policy making process unfolds, the
guidance needed by businesses and consumers is not there.
A major source of the Code's shortcomings is the perspective of
its drafters, who view.the Code primarily as a system of rules to decide
disputes. Virtually all past and contemporary commentaries on the
Code see it in this way.7 The Code's focus on litigation results from
the world view of the drafters-law professors, lawyers, and judges-
all, including the Author, introduced to the law by a study of past
litigated cases.
Today's society requires something better. A commercial code
should have functions much broader and more responsive to the
needs of the business sector and society than simply providing rules
for dispute resolution. In particular, a commercial code ought to help
structure and guide business transactions with a view to facilitating
fair exchanges and avoiding disputes. The concept of "process" is im-
4. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial
Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 725, 726 (1993).
5. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-210, -301, -306 (1990).
6. See DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND THE
DEP'T. OF FIN., REPORT ON A PERMANENT APPROACH TO INTEREST RATE CEILINGS IN
RETAIL INSTALLMENT SALES 173, 191-202 (Richard A. Elbrecht ed., 1987) (reporting sta-
tistics on long-term history and volume of use of credit to finance sales of goods).
7. See, e.g., 1 STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1954,
28-36 (1954) (citing statement of Law Revision Commission by Professor Karl N. Llewel-
lyn, Chief Reporter of Code and Member of Editorial Board); Peter A. Alces, Roll Over,
Llewellyn?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 543,545-48 (1993) (arguing that "the measure of a com-
mercial statute is not the volume of litigation it engenders or discourages, but the quality of
the results that courts can reach when they correctly apply the statute's provisions"). For a
somewhat contrasting view, see Nimmer, supra note 4, at 732.
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portant if our system of law is used for this larger purpose-aiding
business and preventing litigation.
II. THE CONCEPT OF PRocEss
The concept of process is fundamental to the discipline of quality
management.8 A quality-conscious business crafts a process to carry
out each task. It deploys that process, it assesses the results, and it
uses the gathered information to improve the process continuously.
The concept of process calls for an identification and analysis of all the
steps taken to accomplish a task. Only then is it possible to know
enough about how the task is performed to be able to identify and
improve those elements in the process that can be improved.
A. Applying Process Concepts to Enhance Productivity
Today almost every successful business employs the concept of
process creation, deployment, assessment, and continuous improve-
ment. Businesses do it to be efficient, productive,, and competitive. 9
The United States does it so that the United States will remain com-
petitive in an increasingly competitive world market. In all of these
efforts, the goal is to achieve customer satisfaction, the key to long-
term success in any business.
Legal institutions, including courts, practicing lawyers, law
schools, law professors, and institutions, such as the American Law
Institute (ALI) and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), are not separate from society and
should be more active in these efforts. The legal profession's reluc-
tance to work harder and faster to achieve quality in our legal institu-
tions is distressing to businesses whose economic survival depends on
a higher level of efficiency and productivity than our legal system is
now delivering.
Process concepts can be applied to all tasks, including policy mak-
ing and statute drafting. Viewing a transaction as a process means
identifying each element of the transaction from beginning to end. A
consumer transaction may begin with certain disclosures made before
the sale. Or it may begin at the product design, testing, manufactur-
ing, or packaging stage, or even earlier in classrooms where students
8. See, e.g., W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRisis 87 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that
"[e]very activity, every job is a part of a process").
9. Cf id at 18-96 (outlining "14 points" to make Western management more
competitive).
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learn about the subject of the transaction, or where sales and service
agents learn how to sell and service the product. Defining each ele-
ment of the process helps lawmakers identify all the points at which
the law can be used to respond to a particular business or consumer
need.
B. Using Process Concepts to Draft Statutes
The first message of this Essay is that the NCCUSL should view
the subject of future drafting projects as a multidimensional process.
Like courts and business executives, legislators are problem solvers.
Breaking down a problem transaction into its components gives legis-
lators a better opportunity to solve problems. By looking at a transac-
tion in this multidimensional way, legislators can zero in on the real
cause of a problem, identify a menu of potential remedies, select the
one that seems best overall, and in so doing, hopefully avoid either
overkill or a complete miss. Regrettably, few legislators have the in-
clination or time to actually do this. Thus, organizations such as the
NCCUSL are of critical importance because they can proceed in a
more leisurely and thoughtful way with the needed specialists at hand.
The process approach to statute drafting is illustrated by the com-
bined efforts of the ALI, the NCCUSL, Congress, the Federal Trade
Commission, and the California Legislature in the statutes and regula-
tions adopted on consumer product warranties. As imperfect as they
are, the current laws and regulations on consumer product warran-
ties-including the UCC1 0-when taken together, view the consumer
warranty transaction as a process and provide standards and rules
that help to structure and govern most of the major elements of that
process. While these laws do not take the form of a single code, to-
gether they look at the warranty, transaction in its entirety and point
toward what a process-reflecting Uniform Consumer Product War-
ranty Code might look like."
It would be wrong simply to combine these statutes and regula-
tions, and enact the resulting collection of words and phrases as state
10. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 to -317 (1990).
11. The appendix following this Essay demonstrates the wide range of elements of to-
day's consumer product warranty transaction that are addressed by existing federal and
California statutes and regulations. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal aTade Com-
mission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988); Song-Beverly Consumer War-
ranty Act, CAL. Civ. CoD §§ 1790-1795.8 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); Federal Trade
Commission (FrC) regulations issued pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal




or federal law. Many of the statutes and regulations are poorly organ-
ized or drafted. They do not contain a consistent approach and they
lack common definitions. Some provisions do not reflect contempo-
rary practices. Moreover, there are important gaps in coverage. Thus,
the entire package would need to be integrated and organized system-
atically. One of the merits of the NCCUSL's statute-drafting process
is that the viewpoints of many people are brought to bear on a pro-
posed statute through repeated exchanges over a long period of time
during which refinements of these kinds naturally occur.
Why then has the NCCUSL not done a better job of drafting pro-
cess-reflecting statutes? One answer, given above, is the focus on de-
livering a statute that will help lawyers and judges decide disputes, as
distinguished from a statute that is written primarily for use by
nonlawyers, as well as lawyers, as a guide for conducting business.
III. SCOPE OF UNIFORM LAW DRAFTING EFFORTS
A frequently expressed explanation for the NCCUSL's lack of
attention to statute drafting on subjects affecting consumers is that
"consumer protection" is a "local" need that can better be met by
state legislatures. Therefore, consumer protection neither necessitates
nor allows for uniform treatment.12 From the perspective of one who
has spent three decades drafting statutes of this kind, that rationale is
wrong on both counts. Consumer problems tend to be the same in all
states and, for that matter, in market economies throughout the world,
and there is a pressing need for uniformity in the United States.
Since retail transactions are conducted in essentially the same
way throughout the United States, the value of and need for uniform-
ity is clearly present and is steadily increasing as more consumer trans-
actions are consummated across state boundaries. Businesses that
address mass markets have a special need for uniformity, since it is
costly to adapt a product or service to the laws of fifty states. At state
government agencies like the California Department of Consumer Af-
fairs, there is a regular flow of inquiries from law firms throughout the
country seeking to identify the various state laws with which their na-
tional clients must comply. This, by and large, is a truly wasteful ef-
fort, the costs of which we all pay. The lack of uniformity in our laws
also makes it difficult for educators to write materials that will be use-
ful to consumers.
12. See, e.g., Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REv. 679, 682-83 (1991).
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A. Preoccupation with Achieving Consensus
The real reason the NCCUSL has devoted relatively little effort
to drafting consumer protection statutes is neither the local nature of
"consumer protection" nor the lack of need for uniformity, but rather
the NCCUSL's attempt to achieve consensus in its work products.
That approach means that projects on which a consensus is not fore-
seeable-such as the drafting of rules on sales of services-tend not
to be addressed. Since consumer protection tends to present difficult
policy and drafting issues, the drafting of statutes governing consumer
transactions-and other potentially controversial topics-is off limits
for the NCCUSL. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC)13 is
often cited as an example of an attempt of this kind which, for that
reason, was bound to fail. The real reason for not drafting rules gov-
erning consumer transactions, however, is the NCCUSL's reluctance
to tackle difficult tasks.
B. Charting a New Path for Uniform Law Drafters
The second message of this Essay is that the NCCUSL should
abandon its pursuit of consensus and perfection. It should become
more involved in issues-however difficult-including "consumer
protection," in which it can make a valuable contribution, and espe-
cially issues that others will address if it does not. The NCCUSL
should continue striving to fashion proposals whose usefulness to soci-
ety will result in their prompt adoption in every state. However, it
should also view its efforts as do most businesses today; some of its
products will hit the mark while others will miss it, and the true mea-
sure of its success will be the net, overall results.
By focusing on writing statutes that will have the consensus
needed to guarantee their adoption in almost every state, the
NCCUSL is not serving the interests of either the business community
or the consumers. Business and consumer interests in turn have been
forced to look to other statute-drafting bodies or individuals for help,
particularly where the difficulty and importance of the issue requires
that it be addressed head on. For example, the federal Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act14 was an act of desperation as much by consumer
product manufacturers seeking to forestall nonuniform state rules on
13. UNnI. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 1974 Act, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985).
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312.
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written warranties as by consumers seeking to abolish unfair implied
warranty disclaimers or mandate more informative warranties.1 5
The rapid changes in business and society, especially the arrival
of an "information age" in which paper is no longer central, 16 have
given rise to many difficult legal issues whose resolution lies within the
expertise of the legal profession. The need for creative work is so
great that every law professor and every practicing lawyer-should cul-
tivate at least one niche within our legal system in which he or she
devotes real, sustained energy and resources to its improvement. Or-
ganizations like the NCCUSL can do their part by channelling the
profession's creative energies in an organized and responsible way.
C. Advocacy of Special Interests
In carrying out these acts, the NCCUSL also needs to deal with
several other basic problems. Of paramount importance is that the
NCCUSL should not allow itself to be used by business, consumer, or
other special-interest advocates. NCCUSL participants should pledge
to limit their advocacy to the larger public interest, and the NCCUSL
should enforce that rule when reviewing and approving its drafting
committees' work products.
The allegations that the NCCUSL has been co-opted by private
interests' 7 may not be true. However, the NCCUSL must establish
and enforce the principle that advocacy of special interests, or the
drafting or approval of proposals that subordinate the public interest
to the needs of certain private interests, have no place in its
activities."
Private interests can continue to draft and promote their own
proposals, but the NCCUSL's leadership should make it clear that the
15. See BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMrrTH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRAN-
TIES 17.05 (1984 & Supp. 1993); Egon Guttman, U.C.C. D.O.A.: Le Roi Est Mort, Vive
le Roi, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 625, 627, 632 (1993).
16. See John F. Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 579, 582-84 (1993); Patricia Brunfield Fry, X Marks the Spot:
New Technologies Compel New Concepts for Commercial Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 607
(1993); Guttman, supra note 15, at 628.
17. See, e.g., Corinne Cooper, The Madonnas Play Tug of War with the Whores or Who
Is Saving the UCC?, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 563, 571-77 (1993); Edward Rubin, Efficiency,
Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REv. 551, 570-79 (1991);
Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the
Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 743, 787-88 (1993).
18. Participants in uniform law drafting could find helpful guidance in the ideal of the
"lawyer-statesman." See ANTHoNY T. KRONMAN, THE LoSw LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 353-81 (1993).
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NCCUSL cannot be used as a forum for those activities. Advocates of
consumer interests who might object to this should be reminded that if
special interests can participate explicitly, their sheer number will
guarantee that the larger public interest will come in second.
IV. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Another issue that the NCCUSL must address involves the eco-
nomic and political philosophy that guides the substance of its efforts.
Policy decisions are implicit in every statute-drafting exercise. Stat-
utes are not drafted in a policy vacuum. The NCCUSL, in all its stat-
ute-drafting exercises, should make its policy decisions explicit, both
in the commission to its drafting committees and in the official com-
ments to proposed statutes. By making the NCCUSL's policy deci-
sions explicit, a proposed statute is more likely to reflect the
NCCUSL's underlying and overriding policies as well as the policies
that the drafting committee proposes to adopt to implement those
broader policies.
A. Consensus on the Market Process
While matters of policy often seem too controversial even to dis-
cuss, there are some basic principles on which widespread, although
never total, agreement is possible. While the United States frequently
toys with the idea that government can solve all problems, govern-
ment can be a major source of problems if it tries to do too much. The
best service that a government can provide its people is establishing
an infrastructure, including the necessary laws and legal institutions, in
which the market process can operate in a free but disciplined and
civilized way. A functioning market requires functioning legal institu-
tions, as well as political and economic stability, and these can be pro-
vided only by government.19
In practical terms, therefore, most business and consumer repre-
sentatives now widely accept that "the market works best," and laws
that interfere with the market should be avoided and, where they ex-
ist, should be phased out. If they are competently drafted, market-
supporting rules tend to benefit all parties, even when they limit the
conduct of the participants. An excellent example is the federal Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA),20 an originally controversial stat-
ute that has provided a serviceable set of rules which in turn have
19. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 26-33 (1980).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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facilitated the emergence of a new industry and is serving bankers,
businesses, and consumers well.
B. Promoting Disciplined and Civilized Markets
The debacle of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the
ascendancy of the Asian market economies has persuaded most peo-
ple that a command-and-control economy will ultimately fail and
leave consumers "high and dry" with shelves literally bare. A well-
functioning private market is therefore the friend and not the enemy
of consumers. Beyond that, there is an increasingly widespread con-
sensus that government should affirmatively promote the emergence
of competitive markets. It should do so in all areas of commerce, in-
cluding professions and occupations, as well as those industries and
lines of business that are owned by government or operate under the
umbrella of protective regulation. Surely, these principles can serve
as useful guides in a great deal of needed statute drafting by the
NCCUSL.
Without standards, however, freedom can readily degenerate into
chaos. Like all freedoms, market freedoms will be abused, and our
laws must take account of that fact. Businesses everywhere, for in-
stance, work to achieve market power and, if possible, monopoly or
oligopoly status. Some businesses seek to achieve those ends using
unfair means. Our law of unfair competition identifies hundreds of
business activities that are made unlawful because they undermine the
competitive market process.2
The freedoms that business requires in order to be creative, effi-
cient, and productive can be abused in other ways as well. In all lines
of activity, one may carry on business in a way that will shift some of
the costs to nonparticipants and thereby allow the business to price its
products or services below the actual, overall costs and still make a
profit. It is for that reason that laws are needed to ensure that impor-
tant public values that are not respected by the market-for instance,
a healthy and attractive environment-are taken into account in busi-
ness decisions.'
The same freedoms can also be abused in ways that are unfair to
the parties to a transaction, especially consumers. A properly func-
21. See EARL W. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRAcTIcEs: A
GUIDE FOR THE BUSINESSMAN 9-13 (1971); EARL W. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRI-
MER 1-5 (2d ed. 1979).
22. See HERMAN E. DALY AND JOHN B. COBB, JR., FOR THE COMMON GOOD 41-61
(1989).
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tioning competitive market requires an equality of bargaining power
that is difficult to achieve in a retail context23 That is one reason that
the process-oriented approach to statute drafting is important. If a
consumer transaction is viewed as a process involving diverse compo-
nents occurring at possibly different times and places, it is possible to
identify those which are most amenable to creative solutions that will
help equalize the parties' bargaining power while avoiding undue, or
possibly any, costs or market impairment.
The challenge for lawmakers is to craft policies and laws that will
accomplish both ends simultaneously: provide entrepreneurs the free-
dom they need to be creative, efficient, and productive while, at the
same time, ensuring that they do not abuse that freedom. The chal-
lenge is to create a context that will both promote the market process
and its attendant benefits, and ensure that the market functions in a
disciplined and civilized way, without imposing manifestly unfair or
unbargained-for burdens on participants or undue burdens on
nonparticipants.
This approach invites a decision by the NCCUSL to commit itself
to actively promoting a disciplined and civilized market process-the
traditional, mainstream, political, and economic philosophy of the
United States. Thus, the NCCUSL's proposals should respect and
promote the market, and at the same time promote the best interests
of the public-the fourth message of this Essay.
C. Achieving the Right Balance
This balance is not as difficult to achieve as it might seem. Most
"consumer protection" legislation is very pro-marketplace in its orien-
tation. Intuitively, most legislators know that the best interests of
their business and consumer constituents are promoted by market-
friendly policies. Legislative support for proposals that "fight the
market" do not tend to be adopted or are limited in the depth or
scope of their impact. For instance,' where a contract term is specified
by statute, it is usually a term that does not lie at the heart of the
transaction and is rarely the subject of real bargaining or consumer
choice. On the other hand, proposals that help to enhance the effi-
ciency of the market-by giving consumers needed information and
the time to digest it-tend to be adopted if the information is genu-
23. See CoT.SroN E. WARNE, Advertising and the Consumer Movement, in CONSUMER
MovEMENT 91, 91-113 (Richard L.D. Morse ed., 1993).
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inely needed and not otherwise available, and the statute or regulation
is competently crafted.
Very often, opponents attack proposals designed to promote free
and open competition by asserting that these proposals are anti-mar-
ket. Opponents sometimes characterize proposed statutes that limit
conduct as ipso facto anti-market without regard to whether they fa-
cilitate the market process. While it is true that some proposals for
legislation that benefit consumers, or businesses, are injurious to the
competitive market, it is important for the NCCUSL and those partic-
ipating in its statute-drafting exercises to objectively determine the
impact that a proposed statute is likely to have on the market process.
Certain basic questions should be asked of any proposal; for instance:
a) First, does it promote the market process? If yes, all other
things being equal, it is probably desirable. Measures that promote
the market process, by providing needed information in a cost-effi-
cient way, tend to be desirable because market outcomes are generally
beneficial to the community at large.
b) Second, does it resonate well with the market process? Unless
this question is answered affirmatively, the proposal probably should
not be adopted. Proposals that do not resonate with the market gen-
erally should be avoided because the resulting losses in efficiency and
limits on freedom of action can result in significant net losses for ev-
eryone, possibly overriding the advertised benefits of the proposal.
At the very least, a particularly rigorous assessment should be made
of a nonresonating proposal's benefits and costs before the proposal is
adopted. In making such an assessment, it should be recognized that
statutes that limit major contract terms can nonetheless resonate with
the market process. 4
c) Third, do its costs-measured in the broadest sense-exceed
its benefits? If so, it should not be adopted. All statutes and regula-
tions must satisfy the most rigorous standards of both external (public
policy) and internal (legislative drafting) quality. Mandating disclo-
sure of information that costs more to the industry, and ultimately
consumers, than the resulting benefits to consumers, or that has little
real value to consumers, serves no one.
24. An example is the EFTA's limit on liability for unauthorized use of a debit card. 15
U.S.C. §§ 1693g-1693h (1988) (outlining liability limits for consumers and financial institu-
tions respectively). It is a reasonable, indeed necessary, term that allocates risks and then
allows market forces to allocate to the parties the resulting costs. For that reason, it is a
provision that resonates with the market.
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Many legislative proposals, including many sponsored by business
interests, do just the opposite of facilitating market processes. They
give a competitive advantage to one private industry or line of busi-
ness over its competitors. By so doing, they undermine the market
process and injure consumers by denying them the price as well as
other benefits of competition. There probably is more reason to be
on guard against abuses of the market process by legislative proposals
made at the behest of business interests than by proposals that are
advanced by consumer groups.2s
In order to evaluate the trade-offs inherent in policy making of
this kind, the NCCUSL should make extensive use of skills that most
lawyers do not have. Law training usually does not extend to engi-
neering, economics, business management, environmental studies, or
a host of other subjects that may lie at the heart of a needed statute.
It is especially important that the NCCUSL's drafters mobilize the
expertise of capable economists, so that market principles are re-
flected in its proposals.
D. Applying Market-Supporting Policies
How would these proposed NCCUSL policies work in practice?
If they had been in effect in the 1960s, the UCCC would have taken
the lead in proposing the use of simple interest as the measure of the
cost of credit. Instead, despite evidence that the annual percentage
rate (APR) was the most universally understood method of disclosing
credit cost, and therefore would constitute an excellent comparison-
shopping and market-facilitating measure,26 the drafters proposed a
less meaningful measure-dollars of finance charge per hundred dol-
lars of amount financed per year. Furthermore, they totally excluded
that measure from disclosure transactions involving an amount fi-
nanced of less than $300.
25. Economists Bruce M. Owen and Ronald Braeutigam state:
No industry offered the opportunity to be regulated should decline it. ... Regula-
tion protects such industries against competition from outsiders and from within
the industry. It provides a degree of protection from attack. It provides a degree
of protection from congressional investigation. Regulation greatly reduces the
risk of bankruptcy from causes other than competition. And, while regulation
may make very high rates of return difficult to achieve, it does virtually guarantee
a steady stream of adequate profits.
BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTnGAM, Tim REGULATIO N GAME: STRATEOIC USE
OF THE ADMINISMRATIVE PROCESS 2 (1978).
26. See Truth in Lending Bill Hearings on S.5 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Insti-
tutions of the Committees on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (testimony
of former Sen. Paul H. Douglas), reprinted in HOMER KRIPKE, CONSUMER CREDrr.
TExT-CAsEs-MATERIALs 38, 38-49 (1970).
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Since the APR's use as a uniform standard for measuring the cost
of credit would have promoted the competitive market for credit-as
the Truth in Lending Act's 7 adoption of that standard actually has
done2S-the NCCUSL should have had no difficulty incorporating
that concept into its first public draft of the UCCC, rather than wait-
ing until federal legislation was imminent 29 With the benefit of hind-
sight, one can speculate that the UCCC would have fared much better
if it had proposed the APR at the outset, and not under pressure and
before its reputation had begun to suffer as a result of that and other
compromises of the public interest. That is regrettable, since the
UCCC had come close to adopting the process approach to statute
writing recommended here.
Similarly, an NCCUSL proposal for the uniform disclosure of
warranty terms and conditions, like that adopted by Congress in the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,30 would have constituted a pro-mar-
ket, pro-competitive, and pro-consumer measure. Requiring that
written warranties address all of the key terms of a warranty in clear
and conspicuous language cannot help but promote the competitive
market for warranties, and making them available for reading by pur-
chasers before sale cannot help but facilitate comparison shopping by
consumers.31 Fair credit-reporting legislation similarly provides rules
that help ensure the quality of the information that businesses and
consumers need to function in an economy that relies on credit to
finance consumer purchases.
32
Those who oppose measures that help to structure and civilize
important market mechanisms like warranties and credit fail to appre-
ciate the constructive role that law can play in a modem market econ-
omy. Their advocacy, while possibly providing short-term benefits to
some parochial interests, is not supportive of the market process. The
NCCUSL's commitment to the market process would recast the de-
bate on issues of this kind in terms of whether the proposal would
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
28. See Richard L. Peterson, Consumer Finance, in FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE
CHANGING INSTITUTIONS AND GovERNmENT POLICY 185, 200 (George J. Benston ed.,
1983).
29. See CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE 170-71 (1972).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(a) (1988) (requiring full and conspicuous disclosure in "simple
and readily understood language" of terms and conditions of warranty).
31. See CLARK & SMrrH, supra note 15, [ 14.01, at 14-3 (noting that "[t]hrough the
Warranty Act's sometimes tightly woven provisions runs a free-market thread").
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (citing congressional findings of fact
that banking system depends upon fair and accurate credit reporting).
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promote the market process and whether its technical drafting was
capable of being improved.
In point of fact, most of the important statutes affecting consum-
ers-a prime example being the federal Truth in Lending Act33 -have
the function of improving the competitive market by providing con-
sumers with information that helps them to fend for themselves.
While such statutes do impose constraints on behavior, those con-
straints generally have the effect of improving the competitive market.
Well-crafted, market-supporting statutes can also reduce the need for
market-restricting laws by making the market itself operate more
evenhandedly. 34 It was only after the Truth in Lending Act made con-
sumers knowledgeable about and sensitive to interest rates that state
legislatures began to feel comfortable about repealing statutory ceil-
ings on interest rates in consumer credit transactions.3 5
What consumers most often need is not "protection" in a literal
sense. The vast majority of consumers need a level and fair playing
field that provides basic, minimal standards of conduct-particularly
involving fraud and other forms of sharp dealing-and information
that will help them engage in meaningful comparison shopping. They,
and the businesses that serve them, need well-crafted "rules of the
road," just like the drivers of automobiles and trucks need well-
crafted rules of the road for travel on the highways.
V. CONCLUSION
That the NCCUSL is inactive in subject areas that would benefit
from its attention is regrettable. Today, state legislatures continue to
adopt, piecemeal, with almost no coordination among the states, stat-
utes on a wide range of subjects, for example, electronic shopping,3
6
"rent-to-own,"3 7 liability arising from unauthorized "800" and "900"
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e.
34. See RETAIL CREDIT ADVISORY COMM., STATE OF CAL., FINAL REPORT OF THE
RETAIL CREDIT ADVISORY COMMITTEE 42 (1982) (discussing effect of APR disclosures on
consumer sensitivity to interest rates, and its impact on market). The report notes that
"[c]onsumers who shop for credit offer protection for those who do not." Id.
35. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 22, 1988, ch. 479, §§ 1, 9,1988 Cal. Stat.; Act of Oct. 11, 1991,
ch. 819, §§ 2, 14, 1991 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1805.1, 1810.2
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994)); IowA CODE ANN. § 537.1301(19)(a)(1) (West 1987 & Supp.
1994) (removing interest rate ceilings in consumer credit transactions).
36. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1789-1789.8 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).




telephone calls,38 and sales made pursuant to uninvited home solicita-
tions by telephone.39 Subjects of this kind are ideal for NCCUSL
efforts.
If the NCCUSL is willing to relax its insistence on perfection and
consensus, it can begin working harder to meet the real needs of the
business community and the public by its process-oriented, market-
supporting efforts, while realizing that its work products will rarely
meet with universal acclaim.
Statute drafting of this kind will not result in uniform laws, but
neither will the proposals be ignored. Most of them will be adopted.
Those that are adopted and that meet the needs of the business com-
munity and consumers will gain favor because of their excellence and
as a result will be enacted in other states or by Congress.
The NCCUSL is ideally suited to the production of needed stat-
utes that reflect our commitment to both law and the market process.
The NCCUSL should boldly get into the fray and live out its enor-
mous potential for good.
38. There is little explicit guidance by statute or regulation on the formation of con-
tracts or resolution of disputes in this area. Until that is provided, courts probably will
base decisions on regulation, orders, and decisions of state public utilities commissions, the
Federal Communications Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission, and on com-
mon-law contract principles.
39. No explicit guidance is yet provided to telemarketers and consumers on the rules
that govern formation of sales contracts and resolution of disputes in this context.
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APPENDIX
Existing Statutes That Together Might Constitute a Uniform
Consumer Product Warranty Codea°
List of Statutes:
1) Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations, 16 C.F.R.
§§ 701-703 (1994).
2) Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
3) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1790-1795.8 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
4) U.C.C. §§ 1-201, 2-202, -301, -313, -314, -508, -601, -608, -711,
-713, -714, -715, -717, -719 (1990).
5) CAL. COM. CODE § 2719 (West 1964 & Supp. 1994); CAL.
COM. CODE § 2801 (West Supp. 1994).
6) CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 472-472.5 (West Supp. 1994).
7) CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, §§ 3396.1-3399.6 (1990).
I. CONSUMER INFORMATION AND EDUCATION
A. Advertising of Warranty Terms
FrC has the power to adopt rules on labeling and adver-
tising of written warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(B).
B. Pre-sale Availability of Written Warranties
1. FTC has the power to adopt rules on pre-sale availa-
bility of written warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A).
2. Seller must make the text of written warranties
available for examination by prospective buyers before
sale. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a).
40. A selection of provisions in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, federal
Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1988), Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulations adopted pursuant to
that act, 16 C.F.R. §§ 701-703 (1994), and California Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty
Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1790-1795.8 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994), which together address the
consumer warranty transaction as a process.
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3. Supplier must provide sellers with warranty materi-
als necessary for sellers to comply with the pre-sale
availability rules. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(b).
4. Catalogues must either include the text of a written
warranty or provide an address from which free copies
can be obtained. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(c).
5. Door-to-door sellers must have the text of the war-
ranty available for inspection and notify the buyer of its
availability orally and in any written materials. 16
C.F.R. § 702.3(d).
C. Disclosure of Miscellaneous Information
1. Date of sale of the warranted product, in the
purchase receipt. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1795.6(d) (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Names and addresses of the supplier's service and
repair facilities, at the time of sale. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.1(b)(1) (West 1985).
3. Election to require the buyer to directly notify the
manufacturer of the need for repair, made at the time of
sale with the warranty or owner's manual. CAL. Crv.
CODE § 1793.22(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
4. Availability, operation, and effect of any informal
dispute settlement process, made "timely"-for exam-
ple, at the time of sale. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.22(c)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
5. Overview of the buyer's warranty rights and reme-
dies, made in or with warranty service work orders.
CAL. Crv. CODE § 1793.1(a)(2) (West 1985).
6. Dates when the repaired product was received for
repairs and ready for delivery to buyer, made in the war-
ranty service work order or receipt. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1795.6(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
7. Notice that a motor vehicle was returned by a previ-
ous buyer for a replacement or refund, made to the new
buyer prior to the time of sale. CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1795.8 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
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II. SUPPLIER'S WRITTEN WARRANTY PERFORMANCE PROCESS
A. Scope of Application
1. Rules on performance of warranty service are appli-
cable to sales of both new and used consumer products
in which a written warranty that promises future per-
formance characteristics is given. CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1793.2, 1795.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Supplier must maintain or authorize adequate war-
ranty service facilities. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.2(a)(1)(A) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
3. Supplier may delegate -servicing responsibilities to
independent servicers. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1793.2(a)(1)
(B), 1793.6 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
4. If supplier does neither, retailer must provide war-
ranty service at the supplier's expense. CAL. CIv. CODE
§§ 1793.2(a)(2), 1793.5 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
5. Supplier may suggest methods of effecting warranty
service in addition to those specified by statute. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1794.5 (West 1985).
B. Service Literature and Parts
1. Supplier has a duty to make service literature and
parts available during the warranty period. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1793.2(a)(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Supplier has a duty to provide service literature and
parts to servicers of low-cost electronic products for
three years. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.03 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994).
-3. Supplier has a duty to provide service literature and
parts to servicers of higher-cost electronic products for
seven years. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.03(b) (West 1985
& Supp. 1994).
III. CONTENT AND EFFECT OF WRITrEN WARRANTY
A. Warranty Terms
1. Must disclose express warranty terms fully, conspic-
uously, and in simple and readily understood language.
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15 U.S.C. § 2302(a); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.1(a) (West
1985).
2. Must disclose the supplier's terms and conditions of
warranty. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a); 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a).
3. Must disclose the procedures that the buyer must
follow to obtain warranty service. 16 C.F.R.
§ 701.3(a)(5).
4. Must disclose the availability of any informal dis-
pute settlement process. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a)(6).
5. Must label every warranty as either "limited" or
"full." 15 U.S.C. § 2303(a).
6. May not offer a deceptive warranty or include de-
ceptive warranty terms. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c).
7. FTC has the power to adopt rules on warranty
terms. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b), (d), 2306(a).
B. Minimum Standards for "Full Warranties"
If a warranty is labelled "full," certain minimum rights
and remedies apply. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(c).
C. Effect of Written Warranties
1. Supplier is obligated to perform in accordance with
the terms of a written contract. U.C.C. § 2-301.
2. The warranty contract consists of the parties' agree-
ment in fact, including the written warranty, as affected
by all applicable law. U.C.C. § 1-201(3), (11).
3. FTC has the power to adopt regulations extending
the term of a written warranty while the product is out
of service for repairs. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(3).
4. Term of a written warranty is extended while the
product is out of service for repairs. CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1795.6, 1795.7 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
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IV. WR1TrEN WARRANTY REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT
PROCEDURES
A. Obligations of Buyer
1. Must deliver a nonconforming product to the sup-
plier's service facility. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2(c)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Must notify the supplier if the product cannot be re-
turned due to size, weight, et cetera. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.2(c) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
B. Obligations of Supplier [manufacturer or its
representatives]
1. Must commence repairs within a reasonable time.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Must service the product in accordance with the
written warranty within 30 days, unless extended by the
buyer ahd subject to justifiable delay. CAL. Civ. CODE
§ 1793.2(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
3. Must pick up a product that cannot.be returned due
to size, weight, et cetera or repair product at residence
of buyer. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1793.2(c) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994).
C. Obligations of Original Retail Seller
1. Must service a nonconforming product if the sup-
plier does not provide a process to do it. CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1793.3(a)(1), 1793.4 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. May direct the buyer to an independent servicer
that is willing to service the product under the statutory
rules. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1793.3(a)(2), 1793.6 (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
3. May replace 'the nonconforming product with an
identical or reasonably equivalent one. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.3(a)(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
4. May refund the price, less its reasonable-use value.




D. Options of Other Retail Sellers
Other retail sellers of like products from the same sup-
plier may provide the same services as the original retail
seller. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1793.3(b), 1793.4 (West 1985
& Supp. 1994).
E. Supplier's Duty to Compensate Retailers
A retail seller performing servicing duties is entitled to
reimbursement from the supplier of the actual and rea-
sonable costs of the service. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1793.5,
1794.1 (West 1985); see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1792
(West 1985).
F. Supplier's Option to Delegate Duties
Supplier may delegate its duty to perform warranty ser-
vice to others, if its agent is reasonably compensated
and the supplier continues to be responsible. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1793.2(a)(1)(B) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); 15
U.S.C. § 2307.
G. Supplier's Duty to Independent Servicer
Supplier must pay an independent servicer to which it
has delegated performance duties the actual and reason-
able costs of warranty service. CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1793.6, 1794.1 (West 1985).
V. OTHER ExPR xss WARRANTiEs
A. What Constitutes an Express Warranty
1. Oral or written affirmation of fact that becomes part
of the basis of the bargain. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a).
2. Description of the product which is part of the basis
of the bargain, including a description of the product's
future performance characteristics. U.C.C. § 2-
313(1)(b).
3. Advertising that includes an affirmation of fact or
description that becomes part of the basis of the bar-
gain. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a).
4. Sample or model which becomes part of the basis of
the bargain. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(c).
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B. Legal Effect of Express Warranty
1. Supplier is obligated to deliver and perform in ac-
cordance with the terms of the contract of sale. U.C.C.
§ 2-301.
2. The contract of sale consists of the parties' agree-
ment in fact, including any written warranty, as affected
by all applicable law. U.C.C. § 1-201(3), (11).
C. Disclaimer of Express Warranty
1. Disclaimer that contradicts an express warranty is
inoperative, unless the result is unreasonable. U.C.C.
§ 2-316(1).
2. Warranty term (e.g., a "merger clause") that contra-
dicts an express warranty is operative if the parol evi-
dence rule bars evidence of the express warranty.
U.C.C. §§-2-316(1), (2), 2-202.
3. Warranty term (e.g., a "merger clause") that contra-
dicts an express warranty is inoperative, if it is uncon-
scionable. U.C.C. § 2-302; see also CAL. Cxv. CODE,
§ 1670.5 (West 1985).
VI. WARRANTIES IMPLIED By LAW
A. Merchantability Warranty
1. Product must be fit for the ordinary purposes for
which it is used. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1791.1(a) (West 1985).
2. Present in sales by merchants of products of that
kind, unless it is disclaimed. U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
3. Present in unwarranted sales of new consumer prod-
ucts, unless it is disclaimed. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1792
(West 1985),
B. Fitness for a Particular Purpose
Product must be fit for the buyer's particular purpose, if
the supplier knew of that purpose, and the buyer relied
on the supplier's skill or judgment in selecting the prod-
uct. U.C.C. § 2-315; CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1791.1(b),
1792.1, 1792.2 (West 1985).
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C. Retailer's Right of Indemnity
A retailer has a right of indemnity against a supplier for
any derivative merchantability liability. CAL. CIv.
CODE § 1792 (West 1985).
D. Exclusion or Modification
1. Permissible, if manifested by a written, conspicuous
agreement which is part of the basis of the bargain, if its
terms make plain to the buyer that there are no implied
warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316(2), (3).
2. Impermissible, if the supplier or seller also provides
a written warranty, CAL.. Crv. CODE § 1793 (West
1985).
3. Impermissible, if the supplier enters into a service
contract with the buyer. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a).
4. Impermissible, if the supplier provides a written
warranty, except for the period that follows the 'expira-
tion of the written warranty term, -if reasonable. 15
U.S.C. § 2301(c).
VII. REGULATION OF WARRANTY-RELATED PRACrMCES
A. Deceptive Warranties
U.S. Attorney General may maintain legal action to en-
join the use of a deceptive warranty or warranty term.
15 U.S.C. § 2310(c).
B. Tie-in Sales
Supplier may not tie warranty benefits to the con-
sumer's use of articles or services for which charges are
imposed. 15 U.S.C. § 2302(c).
C. Warranty Registration
Buyer's failure to return a warranty registration form to
the supplier does not invalidate the written warranty.
CAL. COM. CODE § 2801.
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VIII. SERVICE CONTRACTS
A. Disclosure
1. Contract terms must be expressed fully, clearly, con-
spicuously, and in readily understood language. 15
U.S.C. § 2306(b); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1794.4, 1794.41
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Contract terms must include the servicer's promises
on a wide range of important subjects. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2302(a); 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a).
B. Obligation of Servicer
Must provide all servicing and parts needed for proper
operation without further charge, except as otherwise
expressly provided. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1794.4(b) (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
C. Cancellation by Buyer
1. Buyer may cancel the purchase of a service contract
within 60 days after receipt of the contract, or within 30
days if the product is a used product and is sold without
a written warranty. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794.41(a)(4)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. In the event of cancellation, the buyer is entitled to
a full refund of the price; if the buyer has made a claim
within that period, the refund is a pro-rata one. CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1794.41(a)(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
IX. SELF-HELP BUYER REMEDIES CONFERRED BY LAW
A. Rejection
1. Buyer may reject a product, before its acceptance, if
it fails in any respect to conform to an express warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-601(a).
2. Seller may cure a nonconformity if the seller notifies
the buyer of the seller's intention to cure and the time
for performance has not expired. U.C.C. § 2-508(1).
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B. Revocation of Acceptance
1. Buyer may revoke the buyer's acceptance of a prod-
uct whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value.
U.C.C. § 2-608(1).
2. Buyer must have been unaware of the nonconform-
ity, or must have accepted the product on the reason-
able assumption it would be cured. U.C.C. § 2-608(1).
3. Buyer must exercise any right to revoke an accept-
ance within a reasonable time. U.C.C. § 2-608(2).
C. Cancellation of Purchase
Buyer may cancel the purchase if the buyer rightfully
rejects or revokes acceptance of the product. U.C.C.
§ 2-711(1).
D. Damages
Buyer who has rightfully cancelled may recover the
price paid, damages, and other relief. U.C.C. §§ 2-
711(1), 2-713.
E. Deduction of Damages from Price
Buyer may deduct damages for a breach of warranty
from the unpaid balance of the price. U.C.C. §§ 2-714,
2-715, 2-717.
X. INFORMAL DisPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
A. Legislative Policy
Encourages fair and expeditious settlement of disputes
by informal dispute resolution procedures. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(a)(1).
B. Supplier's Option to Establish
Supplier, either alone or with others, may sponsor an
informal dispute settlement process. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301(a)(3).
C. Rules Governing Process
FTC has rule-making power. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2).
Substantive requirements apply. 16 C.F.R. § 701.3(a).
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D. Administrative Supervision
1. FTC has enforcement duties. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(a)(4).
2. California Department of Consumer Affairs certi-
fies processes that comply with the governing rules.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1793.22(d)(9) (West 1985 & Supp.
1994); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 472-472.5.
3. Dispute resolution criteria
a. FTC part 703 criteria. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.22(d)(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
b. other state criteria. CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1793.22(d)(2)-(8) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
c. state regulations. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16,
§§ 3396.1-3399.6.
E. Incentives to Supplier and Buyer
1. A buyer must resort to an informal procedure that
complies with federal law before asserting a federally
conferred remedy, if the supplier so requires. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310(a)(3).
,2. A motor vehicle buyer must resort to the supplier's
state-certified, informal dispute settlement procedure
before asserting the state "lemon law" presumption, if
the supplier so requires. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1793.22(c)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
3. A motor vehicle buyer may not assert a claim for a
penalty for a supplier's willful violation of the duty to
replace or refund the price of a nonconforming motor
vehicle if the supplier has a state-certified settlement
process. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(e)(2) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994).
XI. BuYER'S LEGAL REMEDIES
A. Damages
1. Buyer may recover damages for a failure to comply
with a written warranty, other express warranty, service
contract, statute, or regulation. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1);
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U.C.C. §§ 2-714,2-715; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(a) (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Only a supplier "actually making" a written war-
ranty is liable. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(f).
B. Attorney's Fees
Buyer may recover reasonable attorney's fees if the
buyer prevails in a legal action. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(d)(2);
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
C. Penalty for Wilful Noncompliance -
Buyer may recover a civil penalty of up to two times the
buyer's actual damages for a willful failure to comply
with a written warranty, service contract, or legal obliga-
tion. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d)(1) (West 1985 & Supp.
1994).
D. Modification of Remedies
1. Parties may agree to different remedies, such as re-
pair or replacement, and limit or exclude the buyer's
right to damages; and they may agree that the remedy
will be the buyer's exclusive remedy. U.C.C. § 2-719(1).
2. Power to modify the legal remedies conferred by the
UCC is circumscribed:
a. modification is inoperative, if events cause an ex-
clusive remedy to fail to provide a meaningful rem-
edy. U.C.C. § 2-719(2); CAL. COM. CODE
§ 2719(2).
b. modification is inoperative, to extent that the
modification is unconscionable. U.C.C. § 2-719(3);
CAL. COM. CODE § 2719(3).
c. modification is inoperative, with respect to dam-
ages for injury to a consumer. U.C.C. § 2-719(3);
CAL. COM. CODE § 2719(3).
d. attempted modification is inapplicable to legal
remedies conferred by other laws. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1); CAL. Civ: CODE § 1794 (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
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XII. OBLIGATION TO REPLACE OR REFUND PRICE OF
NONCONFORMING PRODUCT
A. Warranted Products in General
1. If the supilier is unable to successfully service a
product after a reasonable number of attempts, it must
either replace it or refund its price. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.2(d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. Supplier is entitled to a credit for the value of the
buyer's use of the product before the nonconformity
was discovered. C.,. Civ. CODE § 1793.2(d)(1) (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
B. Special Rules for New Motor Vehicles
1. If the supplier of a motor vehicle is unable to suc-
cessfully service it after a reasonable number of at-
tempts, it must either replace it or refund its price, in the
manner specified. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d)(2) (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
2. It is presumed that a reasonable number of attempts
to successfully service a new motor vehicle have been
made When certain specified facts are present. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1793.22(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
a. same nonconformity was subject to repair four
or more times. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1793.22(b)(1)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
b. product was out of service for repair of noncon-
formities more than 30 days. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1793.22(b)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
c. "nonconformity" means a nonconformity which
substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the
vehicle. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1793.22(e)(1) (West
1985 & Supp. 1994).
3. Supplier is entitled to a credit for the value of the
buyer's use of the vehicle before the nonconformity was
discovered. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1994).
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